This article investigates how strong German and weak Austrian cooperative federalism affect women's policy machineries. We find that it is the federal organization of both polities that has posited engrained advantages for the establishment and the sustainability of women's policy agencies (WPA). We also find that center/left parties are crucial for sustaining and advancing the role of WPA. However, during economic crises, we see that the women's policy infrastructure in the strong federal state (Germany) was downsized while Austria's national social democratic WPA protects subnational institutions.
more substantive action than in other European countries. In this article, we explore the hypothesis that it is the federal organization of both polities that resulted in the establishment and sustainability of these extensive WPA networks. However, they were not primarily the result of civic mobilization. Instead, in both federalist systems, WPA gained salience through party efforts on multiple levels to create offices to promote women, combat discrimination, and mainstream gender by inserting it into general policy making. Our main question is: To what degree has the federal architecture contributed to the success WPA, and in what ways might federal reform debates or actual changes in the structure of federal arrangements impact WPA? Success refers to the extent to which WPA are institutionalized; governments deciding to expend resources to create and sustain institutional agencies that explicitly address the advancement of women. While we acknowledge that formal institutionalization does not guarantee policy success, it is a central precondition for making gender inequality visible and signaling its importance throughout government and to society at large.
Germany and Austria are considered poster children of unitary and cooperative federalism in the European Union. Both have multiparty systems within rather homogeneous societies. Both are ''party-democracies'' in which political decision making, on all levels, is fueled by party mobilization and organization, thus inviting the labels ''party federalism '' or ''party-federal-state'' (von Beyme 2007; Decker 2011; Gabriel 1989) . Austria and Germany share central features of federalism, but are different in size: Austria has a tenth of the population of Germany; and organization: Austria has nine federal states (Länder), Germany has sixteen Länder, of which five were recreated after unification in 1990. Cultural cleavages are stronger in Germany, amplified by the division between the Western and the new Eastern Länder. In terms of religion, Austria is much more homogenous with 90 percent Catholics (Fallend 2006 (Fallend , 1026 . In Germany, by contrast, Protestants, Catholics, and agnostics each make up roughly 32 percent of the population, with about 5 percent Muslims. Austrian federalism, with its smaller scale, has stronger corporatist and informal components, and a tendency towards decision-making by consensus. In general, Austrian federalism is considered weak, a mere constitutional principle, with few policies being decided on the Länder level and less Länder influence on the federal level (Erk 2004 (Erk , 2008 . In both Austria and Germany, the central government collects roughly 60-75 percent of total state revenues. Yet while in Germany central government spending is relatively small (between 30 and 40 percent), in Austria it is much higher (between 45 and 60 percent) (Anderson 2008, 33-34) . These differences notwithstanding, the two federalisms have enough common features to warrant analysis as ''most similar cases'' (Przeworski and Teune 1970) and thus to hold extraneous variance at a minimum. Comparing the gender infrastructure in these similar cooperative and centralized federal states will enable us to highlight the impact of federalist structure on WPA while also identifying exogenous factors influencing the gender equality agenda, in particular party alignment.
Previous gender research on federalism primarily asked if and under which conditions specific forms of federations favor women's movements' demands. The focus has been on how federal structures influenced ''how women's movements organize'' (Sawer and Vickers 2010, 3) , and utilized different levels of policy making in federations to advance gender policy making and attain gender equality policies (McRae 2010; Chappell 2000) . Of particular interest was how ''organized women can change or circumvent obstructive federal arrangements'' (Vickers 2010, 413) . It was established that several ''vertical'' and ''horizontal'' conditions seem to build windows of opportunity for movement activism, such as ''access to multiple decision-making sites; forum shopping which lets women work around blockage at one governance level and take advantage of an opening at another level; and policy innovations in one jurisdiction which spread to others'' (Vickers, Haussman, and Sawer 2010, 229) . This article proposes an additional dimension to the study of federalism and gender. We follow Benz (2001, 40) in arguing that comparative federalism research needs to take into account institutional settings. Studies of the ''Research Network on Gender, Politics, and the State'' (RNGS) found that WPA play an important mediating role in helping women's movement actors bring their frames and ideas into the policy process (Outshoorn and Kantola 2007; McBride and Mazur 2010) . Thus, WPA can become allies for women's movement actors in their attempts to gender the policy agenda, policy processes, and policy outcomes. This is particularly relevant in states where policy making involves closed decision making, as is often the case in parliamentary federations, with the effect that ''the question of gender impact tends to 'fall off the table' '' (Vickers, Haussman, and Sawer 2010, 235) . Hence, studying the role of WPA in federal states is an important contribution to gendering studies on federalism (see also Chappell 2002; Meier and Celis 2008; Lang 2010; Celis and Meier 2011; Lang and Sauer 2011) .
Utilizing Erk's (2007) guiding questions regarding federalism, this article explores the extent federalism matters for the development of an institutional gender architecture, and to what degree differences in federalism arrangements influence gender equality institutions in Germany and Austria. In particular, we ask how strong German and weak Austrian cooperative federalism shaped women's policy architecture, and how they affect the capacities of WPA. Does the interlocking federalism in Germany provide a better environment for developing a gender equality architecture than the weaker, more centralized informal federalism of Austria? Is informal corporatist federalism in Austria more favorable to stabilizing WPA than the recent turn towards a more competitive federalism in Germany? As institutional change depends on the actors involved in institutions, we look at the capacities and resources of WPA in the field of gender equality policy. This approach does not make the study of policies less important, but it adds an institutional dimension to the gendering of federalism.
In the article, first, we sketch the main features of German and Austrian federalisms. Then we compare the role of WPA in both countries, specifically similar and different effects of federal architecture. Finally, we discuss the impact of parties and economic imperatives on Länder WPA in both countries. In conclusion, we theorize the scope of explanatory power that our cases can attribute to studies of federalism. To assess WPA characteristics and capacities, we conducted interviews with heads or deputy heads of fourteen of the sixteen Länder women's units in Germany and of all the nine Länder women's units in Austria between December 2010 and March 2011. 1 We also consulted the websites of the Länder WPA, government and WPA reports, as well as existing literature on WPA.
Germany and Austria: Outlines of Strong and Weak Cooperative Federations
Federalism is an engrained part of both polities, allowing for cultural diversity, capacity for innovation, and checks and balances. In West Germany, eleven Länder were reinstituted as a central pillar of the post-World War II political architecture to avoid centralization and abuses of power (Gabriel 1989, 66) . In East Germany, by contrast, the Länder were dissolved in 1952, but reinstated after unification. The first Austrian constitution of 1920, reinstituted in 1945, established a federal model with nine Länder (Grotz and Poier 2010, 245; Erk and Koning 2010, 368) . Both countries are not just administrative federations, even though legislation is largely in federal and administration in Länder hands. They are also cooperative federations with a wide array of shared competencies, vertically between the federal and subfederal units, as well as horizontally between the Länder. Vertical cooperation is anchored in both countries' constitutional provision to guarantee uniform or equivalent living conditions among the Länder by redistributing considerable funds from richer to poorer states. German unification strained the unitary fabric of federalism, and exacerbated already existing asymmetries and conflicts, in particular around matters of financial distribution (Benz 1999; Moore, Jacoby, and Gunlicks 2008; Jacoby 2008) . However, opinion polls show that citizens see unitarism as an important feature of German and Austrian federalism. Citizens dislike competition among the Länder and encourage politicians to craft unity among the federal subunits (for Germany, see Petersen, Scheller, and Wintermann 2008, 473; for Austria, Bußjäger and Seeber 2010, 41) . Austrian and German federalism is characterized as highly centralized (Erk and Koning 2010, 371) . Although both federations promote cooperation and ''codetermination,'' they differ strongly with respect to the influence of the Länder. Germany's strong federalism is fostered by (i) a powerful second Parliamentary Chamber, the Bundesrat, in which the Länder governments are represented proportionally and whose powers include all matters of taxation and central policy initiatives; (ii) a strong intergovernmentalism among the Länder and between Länder and the federal state; (iii) the power of the Länder in administering their own Länder policies, and many federal and European Union (EU) policies. German Länder have autonomy in legislation with respect to important policy fields such as education, environment, and labor markets. Yet the strength of the Länder lies in their institutionalized role as partners and frequently as powerful opponents of the federal government (Hueglin and Fenna 2006, 235-36) . This strength is evident in the Bundesrat, which votes on roughly half of the legislation originating in the First Chamber, the Bundestag, and can initiate laws through the ''Second Chamber Initiative.'' By contrast, Austrian Länder have limited autonomy and their influence in the policy-making process via official channels is weak (Fallend 2006 (Fallend , 1024 Erk 2004, 5) . In Austria's ''weak bicameralism'' (Karlhofer 2010, 132) , the Second Chamber of Parliament, which represents the Länder (Bundesrat) plays only a minor legislative role (Fallend 2006 (Fallend , 1028 . Most laws are drafted on the federal level (Nationalrat), while the Länder implement and enforce them.
2 Only in a few policy areas do Austrian Länder have legislative powers, most prominently in community law (Gemeinderecht), for example, in regard to public housing, sports, early childhood education, and citizenship. In effect, Austria has been labeled as a ''federation without federalism'' (Erk 2004 ). Austria's weak federalism is characterized by largely symmetrical, less competitive relations between the Länder (Gamper 2003) . In both countries, a wide variety of intergovernmental connections 3 organize federal vertical and horizontal interaction. Yet, in particular in Austria, formal intergovernmentalism exists side by side with strong informal negotiations between Bund and Länder and between Länder. Lack of formal legislative Länder power in Austria and reliance on informal ties with the executive led to ''unitarization'' as well as centralization, which makes Austria one of the most centralized federal states in the world (Bußjäger 2010; Erk 2004) . The resulting ''executive federalism'' appears closed and opaque, with only limited information available to the public, and little public debate or parliamentary deliberation (Fallend 2006 (Fallend , 1035 . Both federations are characterized by a strong ''party federalism,'' in which parties provide formal as well as ''informal connective mechanisms'' (Karlhofer 2010, 142) . Most policy processes on the Länder and federal levels are dominated by party interests. In Germany, policy cleavages have long been structured by party alignment, but Austria's federalism is based on stronger corporatism with a long tradition of consensus democracy. Increasingly, though, party differences override corporatism and consensus also in Austria. Today, both federations show increasing competition and conflict between Länder as well as between the national and the Länder level if different parties are in power.
Finally, with respect to attempts to reform federalism, the two countries differ fundamentally. While Germany went through heated reform debates after unification (Gunlicks 2005) and passed two federalism reforms in 2006 and 2009, attempts to reform the federal structure of Austria stalled in 2005 (Grotz and Poier 2010). The debates were quite different in the two countries: in Austria, it centered on abolishing federalism; in Germany, on disentangling joint decision making and the equalization principle. Although Austrian federalism was blamed for being too costly for and ineffective in a small country, the Länder successfully defended their power. In Germany, Länder autonomy was strengthened in areas such as education and environment policies while federal efforts to disentangle the ''joint decision trap'' (Scharpf 1988 ) resulted in fewer laws needing Second Chamber approval 4 (see table 1 ).
In sum, while both federations share aspects of institutionalized vertical and horizontal cooperation, Austrian Länder are overall weaker in political agenda setting and policy implementation, more consensus focused, and are therefore more prone to follow federal initiative than German Länder with their stronger ability to initiate innovation independently. Both these similarities and differences in federal organization have impacted the institutionalization of WPA.
The Institutionalization of WPA
In both Austria and Germany, the institutionalization of women's policy infrastructure was the result of strategic decisions by women activists to work in and through the state system to achieve gender equality. With respective federal structures providing multiple entry points for women's activism, it is worth exploring on which level, and in which arenas, WPA were pursued. We argue that the specific forms of institutionalization point to differences in power leverage of federal actors in the two states. WPA-such as Ministries for Women's Affairs, women's policy bureaus and equality offices-in both countries were initiated strategically on the level of governance that promised to deliver the most returns, the Länder and local level in Germany, and the national level in Austria. To substantiate this, we explore WPA levels in more depth. WPA in both states have increased their presence at all levels of government-counties, cities, and also in rural areas. In most EU democracies, small-scale and regional WPA have grown substantially over recent decades (Outshoorn and Kantola 2007, 367 (Considerations 2004, 27) . A second organizational tier in both federations consists of the women's ministries or women's units within ministries of the German and Austrian Länder. These units are in charge of implementing state equality laws and working with women's projects, Länder parliaments, parties, business, and unions to advance equality within the Länder. They communicate with equality officers in public institutions such as the courts, universities, hospitals, and public media as well as with the municipal and regional WPA. All German Länder institutionalized such WPA since the early 1980s, albeit on different levels of Länder executive bureaucracies and with uneven infrastructure and budgets. Moreover, all German Länder have established gender equality laws for the civil service and most have antidiscrimination laws. Through the Second Chamber, they initiated initiatives to change federal law, thus maximizing influence within their federalist position.
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WPA in the Austrian Länder and municipal governments are ''underdeveloped,'' the exception being Vienna (Pelinka and Rosenberger 2007, 227) . The nine Austrian provinces established ministries or departments for women's issues only in the mid-1990s. Moreover, they are responsible for family affairs, social affairs, youth, and other related fields.
8 Much like social organizations with little formal power, In 1986, ''women'' were added to the ministerial title. In the first decade, this new ministry was shaped by three conservative women's ministers, among them the current Chancellor Angela Merkel between 1991 and 1994. The influence of women's ministers was limited to the right to initiate legislation if cabinet colleagues were not willing to do so; the right to comment on all legislation affecting women; and finally the right to delay legislation that was deemed by the national WPA as having a negative effect on women. The national WPA was completely dependent on the chancellors' and all cabinet colleagues' cooperation and thus during the sixteen-year era of conservative Chancellor Kohl for the most part sidestepped and silent. Since the mid-1990s, left/center social democratic women led the ministry and accelerated policy successes such as a 1996 law to create the right to a child care space for every child three years and older, a 1997 law that banned marital rape, and a law in 2001 that established parental leave. Overall, the German federal WPA is considered weak, leaving most policy initiatives to the Länder level. In Austria, the federal level WPA historically has taken center stage in gender equality matters. In 1979, the first federal WPA, the State Secretary's office for ''general women's issues,'' was established in the Chancellery.
9 Johanna Dohnal, a well-known SPÖ feminist with backing from the party's women's organization and with strong ties to the autonomous women's movement, was appointed to head the office. In 1990, negotiations to form a new coalition government included an upgrade, turning the position into a full-fledged Federal Ministry of Women's Affairs. The minister gained a veto in the cabinet of ministers and the right to initiate women's policy, the most prominent being the 1996 law fighting violence against women in the family, which was the first antiviolence legislation in Europe. When Austria elected its first postwar Christian-conservative and right-wing populist coalition government between Ö VP and FPÖ in 2000, the federal women's ministry was abolished. A unit for women's affairs became part of the Ministry of Social Security and the Generations, and in 2001 a ''men's unit'' was added to coordinate and initiate research into men's roles and needs. Only after the 2007 election that restored a grand coalition were the Social Democrats able to negotiate the establishment of a women's ministry under Social Democratic leadership. In the following years, major gender legislation was passed, such as quotas for corporate boards of public enterprises. Pelinka and Rosenberger (2007, 228) judge the Austrian Länder level more ''gender equality resistant.'' 10 One of several examples is the delay of most Länder in implementing gender equality laws for public service. While the federal level legislated this in 1979, the Länder waited until the mid-1990s (Rosenberger 1997, 692) . Only when massive blockages occur at the national level-for example, when the conservative/right-wing coalition government shuts down the women's ministry-do progressive Länder politicians and their WPA step in. 11 Thus, although the federalization of WPA in Austria produced a network of agencies that broadened the basis for state-feminist intervention similar to Germany, Austrian WPA interventions are for the most part top-down. With no ability to initiate federal law, the Länder foster a gender equality agenda primarily through formal and informal cooperation, mainly via party channels and by sponsoring women's projects.
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The ability of the German Länder to initiate laws has resulted in many highly visible attempts by center/left Land coalitions or parties to legislate on the federal level, such as recent attempts by North Rhine-Westphalia to introduce a quota for women on corporate boards or a 2005 Second Chamber Initiative by the State of Berlin against forced marriage. Even if initiatives by center/left governed Länder do not pass in a center/right federal parliament, they get public attention and create discursive institutional platforms on which to promote gender equality.
In sum: There is evidence that the three-tiered network of WPA in Germany and Austria profited in several respects from cooperative and interwoven federalism. (i) In both countries the institutionalization of WPA on the Länder and municipal levels produced rich and dense gender equality networks. (ii) Federalized WPA provided the political opportunity structure for the creation of locally and regionally based women's projects. 13 (iii) Blockages on one level of government, as with the conservative parties' rule, to some degree can be offset by engagement of women's actors on another level of government. Yet, empirical evidence also points to differences in WPA influence between the strong cooperative federalism in Germany and the more centralized federalism of Austria. Länder strength matters for WPA, and in particular the German Länder right to initiate legislation as well as their ability to work through established and formalized communication routes with levels above and below. In the absence of such a political opportunity in the Austrian case, it needed the party commitment of a Social Democratic party in national government in the mid-1970s to push a gender equality agenda into the public arena. In effect, the political opportunities that federalist organization creates for institutionalized WPA are in both cases only valuable if there are parties that utilize them. We will elaborate this point in the final section of this article.
Party Federalism and WPA
Party alignment in both states has had substantial impact on WPA institutionalization. The fact that policy initiatives in both countries are channeled exclusively through parties means that innovation from above and from below has to be launched via parties. WPA are thus in both states best situated and protected if they operate under Social Democratic or Green parties. While this is not a surprising finding, what is noteworthy is how WPA have spread and multiplied even under conservative governments. We attribute this ''contagion'' effect to the dynamics of party federalism. While party alignment is central, cooperative federalism in both countries has encouraged what Dimaggio and Powell call ''upward isomorphism'' (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Assuming that ''organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful'' (Szelznick 1996 ), WPA success on one level of government increased the chances of institutionalization in other horizontal or vertical contexts. In effect, the history of WPA institutionalization in the two federations shows such contagion effects, but in the opposite direction: from the top down in Austria; from the bottom up and horizontally in Germany. For Austria, we have already established the central role of the Social Democrats in creating a federal women's ministry and using centralized federalism to push a left leaning policy agenda from above. It was the Social Democratic federal government and its WPA that created pressure on the left and right Länder governments to establish gender equality institutions since the late 1980s. Hence, in the 1990s with a time lag, all Länder governments upgraded their WPA infrastructure and established women's ministries. Party alignment, however, remained relevant insofar as leftist Länder governments institutionalized and expanded WPA on a larger scale than conservative Länder. The Austrian model is the city-state of Vienna, known as ''red Vienna'' since the 1920s for its continuity of socialdemocratic governments. Vienna established a department for women's issues in 1992, which has been growing since and today has thirty-seven staff members. Also, conservative Austrian Länder were late in implementing a gender equality law for the public service, for instance Lower Austria and Vorarlberg in 1997.
But even under conditions of stronger Länder autonomy and more formalized cooperation in Germany, party alignment mattered. As in Austria, Germany's women's policy architecture is a result of efforts by women activists in and through the Social Democrats and the Greens. Yet in contrast, contagion in Germany happened from below. The left/center Länder coalitions in Germany adopted WPA as early as the beginning 1980s, when conservative Länder still had almost no women in parliament and the executive.
14 Yet women activists from within the conservative party could point to the success of WPA in other Länder and thereby draw their own government into action. Cooperative federalism thus provided the basis for the institutionalization of Länder WPA with differing economic, social, religious, and ideological backgrounds. It provided for routinized communication venues in which contagion could occur. Länder that had not yet developed a women's policy infrastructure were scrutinized and ''shamed'' by women activists from within and by other Länder representatives from outside. A similar process could be witnessed during unification and the accession of five new Länder after 1990. All eastern Länder were urged to use administrative guidance and assistance from western Länder in building state bureaucratic infrastructure. 15 The western states delivered the blueprints; the new Länder adopted them with slight variations. Cooperative federalism guaranteed the adoption of the women's policy machinery in the East, and also replicated specific kinds of institutionalization according to party-federalist blueprints.
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After 1990, all eastern states adopted versions of western states' equality laws and equality machinery. Typically, the type of WPA created in the five new Länder mirrored that of their western partner. Thus, the Land Brandenburg, with its social democratic partner state North Rhine-Westphalia, devised one of the most progressive gender equality laws and a strong WPA. Saxonia, on the other hand, with the rather uncommitted and conservative Land Baden-Württemberg as partner, ended up with a weak legal equality framework and precarious institutionalization of equality offices. At work in this adaptation process were thus federalist cooperations alongside party alignments.
WPA in Times of Fiscal Austerity
As cooperative federalism allows for the upward adaptation of gender issues, it makes these very institutions vulnerable to Länder-specific prioritizing in fiscal crisis. Under fiscal strain and with increasing Länder competition under purely economic imperatives, downward adaptation can take place. This has become dramatically evident in recent years as a weak German economy combined with increasing public debate about a more competitive federalism (Jeffery 2008 ) put WPA on the defensive.
During the past decade, the women's policy infrastructure in several states has been substantially reduced on the Länder and municipal level. The personnel situation in the Länder women's units reveals that most WPA have been downsized since 2000. However, the WPA in Länder with center/left governments have remained substantially larger than in Länder with center/right governments. This latter observation is independent of Länder size: Berlin for example, a city state with 3.4 million inhabitants, has the largest WPA; Baden-Württemberg, a traditionally conservative state with 10.7 million inhabitants, has a combined WPA with less than a quarter of Berlin's employees. However, as an interviewee from another city-state, Hamburg, states: ''Our department was cut down in the process of budget consolidation since 2009'' (Interview/Hamburg/G., January 2011).
As table 2 shows, ten of the fourteen German Länder WPA in which we interviewed staff have seen their budgets for personnel shrink in the past decade. A report on the implementation of Berlin's Equal Opportunity Law in 2004 states that due to budget restrictions, affirmative action proves to be rather difficult (Senatsverwaltung 2004) . However, budget cuts are not the only way of disempowering WPA in times of fiscal austerity; it can also happen through the restructuring of the agency by merging women's units into multiservice offices. For instance, in Thuringia, women's issues became part of the Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Families. Our interviewee in Saxony-Anhalt stated that the former Department for Women's Affairs was demoted to a unit within the Department of Family, Seniors, Children and Women in 2010 (Interview Saxony-Anhalt/G., January 2011). Similarly, the WPA in Hamburg was merged into an administration of ''diversity'' unit under a government coalition of conservatives and Greens (Interview Hamburg/G., January 2011).
By contrast, Austria experienced no turn towards stronger competitive federalism and less of a public austerity program. Reviewing the development of resources and personnel in the last year of the ministerial administrations in the Länder, we find party alignment central to advancing WPA (see table 3): Länder with social-democratic governments kept the same staff or even raised WPA resources (e.g., Burgenland, Salzburg, and Vienna), whereas WPA in conservative Länder experienced more cuts in personnel or were only able to secure the status quo (e.g., Lower Austria, Upper Austria, and Tyrol). We could interpret this as an effect of the strength of the Social-Democratic women's organizations on the Länder level; or it could be due to competition between the conservative federal government, which abolished the federal women's ministry at the beginning of the new century, and the left Länder governments, using women friendliness as part of their mobilizing strategy for federal elections. However, the situation is paradoxical: in Carinthia the number of the personnel increased, but their working conditions and salaries worsened (Interview, Carinthia/A, January 2011). The WPA in Vorarlberg had a small increase in personnel, but budget cuts since the year 2010 have made the situation worse (Interview, Vorarlberg/A, January 2011).
In Germany, federalism reform, especially the introduction of competitive elements, as well as budget cuts, led to a downsizing of the Länder women's policy machinery. But despite a discourse of federalism being too costly, budget cuts did not affect the Austrian Länder WPA dramatically. This might be explained by rather poor resources of the women's infrastructure from the start and by the government change on the federal level in 2000: the Social Democratic governments 
Two full time One part time Women's Policy Agencies in Germany and Austria on the Länder level promised to compensate for any lack of national funding for women's projects and increased Länder resources for the WPA. Moreover, the threat to abolish the Länder altogether in the Austrian federalism reform discourse might have reduced (party) competition and fostered solidarity. Inadvertently, it might have helped solidify and strengthen the Länder administrations, including WPA.
Conclusion: The Conditionality of Party-Federalism for Gender Equality Architecture
In this article we explored how federalism affects the women's policy architectures in Germany and Austria and, in particular, the degree to which strong and weak federalism creates different institutional anchors for WPA. Overall, we found that cooperative federalism advances a vertically and horizontally dense WPA infrastructure. Even though cooperative federalism is consensus-oriented, conservative, and rather averse to individual Länder experiments and innovation (Wiesenthal 2004) , it produced strong WPA in both countries. Rather than women's movement actors utilizing federalism from outside, in both Germany and Austria it was feminists moving inside the state that advanced WPA. Hence, cooperative federalism offers more opportunities on different levels for WPA development and activity as allies for women's projects and, thus, for ''state-feminism'' (McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995) . A second finding regarding the advantage of cooperative federalism is that left/ center parties are crucial for advancing gender equality in federal states (see also Chappell and Curtin in this issue). In strong party states with socially homogenous populations, women's movement demands are channeled primarily through center/ left parties (Social-Democratic and Green parties). Women's voice and policies, as well as visible gender infrastructure, would thus have to be more prevalent on those levels of politics in which center/left parties are in power. The familiar metaphor of ''marble cake federalism'' denotes this interplay between state scales and party influence. Resources in the Austrian and German contexts seem to be not so much fragmented, as controlled by more or less centralized parties. WPA appear to be integrated into a hierarchical network of party-affiliated local, regional, and national networks and tend to profit from left party coalitions in power.
A third finding of this article points to economic conditions as an intervening variable in the relationship of federalism and WPA in these cases. We found that in economically stable times interlocking federalism is advantageous for women's policies, but in economically challenging times it tends to produce downward adaptation and the marginalization of women's equality agendas. We find wanting interpretations of interlocking federalism that stress only its negative effects, for example, as creating joint decision traps. In our cases, interlocking federalism early on generated the push to establish at least a baseline of WPA across Länder. Hesitant political actors were forced to engage with more advanced players in women's policy fields in more informal contexts in Austria, but more formally in Germany. Contagion and upward adaptation seem to have been driving gender politics. But as Austrian and German Länder increasingly faced fiscal constraints, we have found that even in center/left Länder governments, gender politics must compete for resources with what many consider economically more ''central'' or ''system-relevant'' fields. Gender politics tends to become subsumed under other diversity agendas or marginalized, unless, as we see in the City States of Vienna and Berlin, a vital women's reform culture and a vocal women's movement exist. Downward adaptation takes place less in Austrian Länder, where the WPA infrastructure is perceived as a counterbalance against a dominant, centralized federal WPA.
Fourth, we found that unlocking interlocking federalism in economically challenging times can produce downward adaptation and marginalization of women's equality agendas. In both Austria and Germany, there were attempts to reform federalism. The more radical abolitionist Austrian debate created a push back from the threatened Länder and increasing WPA leverage and solidarity. By contrast, Germany embarked on two federalism reforms in 2006 and 2009; both of which fell short of their advocates' intentions (Grotz and Poier 2010, 234; Burkhart 2009; Blumenthal 2010 ), but created frames for public discourse that emphasized fiscal austerity and shedding of ''nonessential'' state functions. Under conditions of more competitive federalism, WPA are seen by many as nonessential and therefore under strain. Consequently, this competitive devolution might endanger progressive gender reform policies even in strong federal states.
Finally, this article provided evidence that national steering capacity remains central in promoting gender equality. With the tax base of Länder increasingly eroding, while the federal level downloads more responsibility for policy implementation onto the Länder level, the Länder are fiscally squeezed in austerity frameworks in both Austria and in Germany. The choices they make reflect a focus on ''hard politics'' so that gender equality issues are conflated with other diversity issues. Only if the national level remains committed to exercising its steering capacity will WPA be able to maintain their status as central institutionalized hubs for promoting gender equality.
In the context of what we initially defined as success of WPA, we conclude that federal structures do promote the establishment of units explicitly devoted to gender equality issues on multiple levels of government; but that, overall, the strong cooperative federalism in Germany has guaranteed a more solid and powerful infrastructure than weak Austrian cooperative federalism. Yet there is reason to caution against overdetermination in regard to federalism. Favorable party alignment and economic conditions, in particular also are crucial in order for federalism to develop its impact on WPA in Germany and Austria.
10. Examples are the objections of the then Ö VP dominated Bundesrat against the liberal abortion law in 1974 and the parental leave regulations in 1986 (Pelinka and Rosenberger 2007, 228) . 11. At the time, the Land Vienna, for example, took over funding for many women's projects. 12. Women's increased political representation and power as policy makers does not necessarily alter policy outcome, but women politicians have the power to alter agendas (Celis 2008 (Goetz 1999, 92) . And even though home institutional features were not copied one-to-one, central arrangements can be traced to the influence of the Western partners, also in the case of the women's policy infrastructure.
